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Abstract 
This paper presents a new incentive compatible method for measuring confidence 
in own knowledge. This method consists of two parts. First, an individual answers 
several general knowledge questions. Second, the individual chooses among three 
alternatives: 1) one question is selected at random and the individual receives a 
payoff if he or she has answered this question correctly; 2) the individual receives 
the same payoff with a probability equal to the percentage of correctly answered 
questions; 3) either the first or the second alternative is selected. The choice of the 
first (second) alternative reveals overconfidence (underconfidence). The individual 
is well calibrated if he or she chooses the third alternative. Experimental results 
show that subjects, on average, exhibit underconfidence about their own 
knowledge when the incentive compatible mechanism is used. Their confidence 
in own knowledge does not depend on their attitude towards risk/ambiguity. 
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Betting on Own Knowledge:  
Experimental Test of Overconfidence 
This paper investigates whether people think that they know more than 
they actually do. There is a substantial literature in psychology which suggests 
that people are apparently overconfident about own knowledge (e.g. Keren, 1991; 
Yates, 1990). In a typical experiment, subjects answer several binary-choice 
general knowledge questions. For each question, subjects have to choose which of 
the two suggested answers is correct in their opinion. Subjects are also asked to 
indicate their confidence on a 50%-100% scale that their answer was correct. 
Individual responses are then sorted by the revealed confidence level and the 
percentage of correct answers in each confidence category is calculated. Subjects 
are classified as overconfident if their stated confidence judgments are greater 
than the corresponding percentage of correctly answered questions. 
Subjects are rarely overconfident in every confidence category. A typical 
finding is that subjects appear overconfident for difficult questions (percentage of 
correct answers below approximately 75%) and underconfident or well calibrated 
for easy questions. This became known as the hard/easy effect (e.g. Lichtenstein 
and Fischhoff, 1977). However, Juslin et al. (2000) recently conducted a meta-
analysis of 17 previous studies and found that the hard/easy effect is nearly 
eliminated when a researcher carefully controls for the scale-end effects (the upper 
and the lower bound on confidence scores) and liner dependency. 
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Gigerenzer et al. (1991) argue that subjects appear overconfident because 
an experimenter often selects non-representative general knowledge questions for 
which commonly used cues are not particularly useful. Gigerenzer et al. (1991) 
find that observed overconfidence is significantly reduced if a representative set 
of general knowledge questions is used in the experiment. This finding was 
replicated in several other studies (e.g. Juslin, 1994; Winman, 1997).  
However, Griffin and Tversky (1992) and Suantak et al. (1996) argue that 
a representative set of general knowledge questions is often too easy for subjects 
and they reveal underconfidence due to the hard/easy effect. Juslin et al. (2000) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 95 studies with non-representative general know-
ledge questions and 35 studies with representative general knowledge questions.  
Juslin et al. (2000) found that the overconfidence phenomenon is less pronounced 
in the latter studies even after controlling for the difficulty level of both samples. 
People often appear overconfident for questions where they possess a self-
declared expertise (Heath and Tversky, 1991) but their overconfidence decreases 
for questions where they find themselves incompetent (Kruger, 1999). Erev et al. 
(1994) argue that different research methods can generate both an apparent over-
confidence and an apparent underconfidence from the same data, if we allow for 
the possibility that true judgments are perturbed by random errors. Soll (1996) 
points to a considerable heterogeneity in the individual data—some people appear 
to be systematically overconfident whereas others are biased to underconfidence. 
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Psychological studies of confidence in own knowledge typically do not 
provide financial incentives for revealing subjective confidence in an experiment. 
In contrast, economic literature on overconfidence usually employs monetary 
payoffs. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) find strong evidence of overconfidence in 
an experimental market entry game. Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) observe 
overconfidence according to subjective judgments but not according to revealed 
choices in an experimental asset market. Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) find that 
overconfidence changes to underconfidence when an experimental task becomes 
less familiar and this effect is stronger with monetary incentives.  
However, these economic papers do not measure confidence in own 
knowledge. They document an above average effect—people perceive themselves 
more favorably than they perceive the average member of their reference group. 
The above average effect does not necessarily indicate that people overestimate 
their group ranking in terms of general knowledge, ability etc. Such apparent 
overconfidence may also reflect a subjective belief that the distribution of general 
knowledge, ability etc. is highly skewed in the relevant reference group (related 
discussion is in Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2006; Krajc and Ortmann, 2008).  
When it comes to the measurement of confidence in own knowledge with 
monetary incentives, the most popular method is arguably an elicitation of 
confidence intervals (e.g. Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). In a typical setting, 
subjects are asked to reveal a lower and upper bound for the n-percent confidence 
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interval of a correct answer to a general knowledge question. Subjects are 
classified as overconfident if a correct answer falls into the stated interval in less 
than n-percent of cases. Using this method, Cesarini et al. (2006) observe that 
overconfidence is reduced by about 65 percent when monetary incentives and a 
frequency rather than a probability assessment are introduced. However, the 
confidence interval elicitation method is not incentive-compatible because 
subjects can deliberately misrepresent their confidence intervals (as explained in 
detail in the next section). 
This paper presents a new incentive-compatible method for measuring 
individual confidence in own knowledge and/or ability. In the proposed method, 
overconfidence is tested by means of a simple (non-strategic) choice problem. 
Subjects receive an opportunity to bet either on their own knowledge and/or 
ability or on an equivalent lottery. Subjects, who decide to bet on own knowledge 
and/or ability, are classified as overconfident and subjects, who decide to bet on 
the risky gamble,—as underconfident. Unlike other methods of measuring 
individual confidence, such as the estimation of confidence intervals, our 
proposed method is incentive-compatible. Subjects cannot increase their monetary 
payoffs through deliberate misreporting of their confidence assessment, through 
conscious incorrect answering or through strategically chosen low effort. 
The paper also presents the results of an experiment, where the proposed 
method is used for measuring individual confidence in general knowledge trivia. 
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Experimental results show that subjects, on average, exhibit underconfidence 
about their own knowledge when the incentive compatible mechanism is used. 
Their subjective confidence does not depend on their risk/ambiguity aversion or 
seeking i.e. our proposed measure of confidence in own knowledge is not 
confounded with individual risk attitudes or attitudes towards ambiguity. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes a 
new incentive-compatible method for measuring individual confidence in own 
knowledge. Section II presents the design and implementation of the experiment. 
Section III presents the experimental results. Section IV concludes. 
I. Method 
 As we already mentioned in the introduction, a popular method for 
measuring individual confidence is an elicitation of confidence intervals. In a 
typical setting, subjects are asked to reveal a lower and upper bound for the n-
percent confidence interval of a correct answer to a general knowledge question, a 
future price in the experimental market, a ranking of their ability level etc. 
Subjects are classified as overconfident if a variable of interest falls into the stated 
interval in less than n-percent of cases. Experimental papers in psychology 
typically do not provide monetary incentives for reporting confidence intervals. 
Experimental papers in economics usually offer a small reward to subjects 
if a variable of interest falls into the revealed confidence interval with the stated 
frequency. For instance, Cesarini et al. (2006) ask subjects to provide a 90-percent 
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confidence interval for numerical answers to 10 general knowledge questions. 
Subjects are then asked to assess if the correct answers indeed fall into the stated 
intervals and they are awarded approximately 6 USD for each correct assessment.  
Despite the popularity of the method, elicitation of confidence intervals is 
not incentive-compatible. If subjects are not informed about the exact mechanism 
how they earn money before they state their confidence intervals, there is no 
financial incentive for revealing subjective confidence intervals.1 If subjects are 
informed about their payoff function at the beginning of an experiment, they can 
increase their monetary payoff if they deliberately misrepresent their confidence 
intervals. For instance, Cesarini et al. (2006) report that one subject anticipated 
subsequent development of the experiment and strategically misreported his 
stated confidence intervals—for nine questions this student reported extremely 
wide confidence intervals and for one question he made a point estimate (so that 9 
out of 10 of correct answers would fall into the stated 90-percent confidence 
intervals with relative certainty). 
To avoid such problems associated with payoffs contingent on the 
realization of a variable of interest inside the stated confidence intervals, we 
propose a new method for measuring individual confidence. The proposed 
method consists of two parts. In the first part, a subject is asked to answer N>1 
                                                 
1 In this case, subjects state confidence intervals without any knowledge whether too wide or too 
narrow intervals will increase or decrease their monetary payoffs. Since subjects do not know how 
their choice of confidence intervals affects future monetary payoffs, they do not have financial 
incentives for revealing true confidence intervals. 
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general knowledge questions or to contribute his or her effort in ten tasks, where 
success depends on individual ability. The subject is informed that the more 
questions he or she answers correctly (the more tasks he or she completes 
successfully), the higher are the chances of getting a fixed monetary payoff M. 
In the second part, the subject faces a choice between the following 
alternatives: 
1) One of N questions (tasks) is selected at random and the subject receives a 
fixed monetary payoff M if his or her answer to the selected question was 
correct (the selected task was completed successfully); 
2) The subject plays a risky lottery that yields a fixed monetary payoff M with 
probability n/N, where n is calculated as the number of correctly answered 
questions (the number of tasks completed successfully) in the first part; 
3) Either alternative 1) or alternative 2) is selected at random. 
Alternatives 1)-3) yield identical distributions of monetary outcomes. 
Thus, a well-calibrated subject is indifferent between all three alternatives. 
However, an individual, who is overconfident about own knowledge and/or 
ability, would prefer alternative 1) and an individual, who is underconfident, 
would opt for alternative 2). Thus, we have a simple measure of individual 
confidence in own knowledge through a revealed choice. 
Notice that the proposed method is incentive-compatible because subjects 
cannot increase their payoff if they deliberately provide incorrect answers to some 
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of the general knowledge questions or if they strategically contribute a lower 
effort in some of the tasks. In such cases subjects still face a choice among 
identical probability distributions at the second part of the experiment (although 
with less favorable odds). As long as individual preferences satisfy first-order 
stochastic dominance, subjects cannot gain from giving deliberately incorrect 
answers (or strategically lower effort). Thus, our method avoids the incentive 
problems associated with the elicitation of confidence intervals.  
However, one can argue that the proposed measure of individual 
confidence in own knowledge might be confounded with individual risk aversion 
and/or ambiguity aversion. At the second part of the experiment, individuals are 
confronted with a choice between an ambiguous lottery (alternative 1) and a risky 
lottery (alternative 2). Thus, risk and ambiguity attitudes may affect the observed 
choices. To investigate this possibility, we run a controlled laboratory experiment, 
where we measure individual confidence according to the proposed method as 
well as individual risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. We find that observed 
subjective confidence does not depend on risk/ambiguity aversion or seeking. 
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II. Experiment 
 The experiment is designed to test individual confidence in own 
knowledge without self-assessment relative to the reference group because an 
individual may have little or no information about abilities of other subjects. 
Individual confidence is measured in a simple decision problem. Initially, subjects 
receive ten general knowledge questions, each with five possible answers (e.g. 
Table 1). Subjects are informed that the more questions they answer correctly, the 
higher is their potential payoff. Having answered all questions, subjects face a 
choice among three alternatives:  
1) one of ten questions is selected at random and the subject receives 50 CHF 
(~39 USD) if he or she answered this question correctly and 1 CHF (~1.28 
USD) if his or her answer was incorrect; 
2) one card is randomly drawn from a box with ten cards numbered from 1 to 10 
and the subject receives 50 CHF when the number on the drawn card is 
smaller than or equal to n  (1 CHF otherwise). n  is calculated as a number of 
questions that the subject answered correctly2; 
3) either alternative 1) or alternative 2) is selected (the subject presses button 
“Both alternatives are the same”). 
                                                 
2 Although subjects see the number n , they are not informed that this is exactly the number of 
their correct answers. 
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Alternatives 1)-3) yield identical distribution of monetary outcomes but 
subjects are not aware of this fact. Subjects are classified as overconfident (i.e. 
overestimating own knowledge) if they select alternative 1), as underconfident 
(i.e. underestimating own knowledge)—if they select alternative 2), and well 
calibrated—if they select alternative 3). Notice that alternative 1) involves an 
ambiguous lottery (betting on an uncertain event) and alternative 2) involves a 
risky lottery (betting on an event with a known probability). Thus, ambiguity 
averse subjects may be inclined to choose alternative 2) and risk averse subjects 
may prefer alternative 1). To control for risk attitudes we measured risk aversion 
and ambiguity aversion of every subject. 
Holt and Laury (2002) method is used for measuring individual risk 
aversion. A subject is faced with nine lottery pairs { },, ii RS  { }9,...,1∈i . A safer 
lottery iS  yields 20 CHF with probability 10i  and 16 CHF otherwise. A riskier 
lottery iR  yields 40 CHF with probability 10i  and 1 CHF otherwise. In each of 
nine lottery pairs a subject can choose either a safer lottery, or a riskier lottery, or 
can declare indifference (in this case lottery is selected at random). A risk neutral 
expected utility maximizer chooses lottery iS  when 4≤i  and lottery iR  — when 
5≥i . A risk seeking individual switches from iS  to iR  when 3≤i  and a risk 
averse individual—when 5≥i . 
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A similar method is used for measuring individual attitudes towards 
ambiguity. A subject is confronted with nine lottery pairs { },, AU j  { }9,...,1∈j .  
An unambiguous lottery jU  delivers 50 CHF with probability 10j  and 1 CHF 
otherwise. An ambiguous lottery A  delivers either 50 CHF or 1 CHF with 
unknown probabilities. A subject is classified as ambiguity neutral if he or she 
chooses lottery A  when 5<j  and lottery jU  — when 6>j . A subject is 
classified as ambiguity averse if he or she switches from A  to jU  when 4≤j . A 
subject is classified as ambiguity seeking if the switch occurs when 6≥j . 
All 18 lottery pairs that are used for eliciting individual risk attitudes are 
presented to subjects in a random order. At the end of the experiment one of the 
problems is selected at random and subjects receives their payoffs according to 
their choices in the selected problem (a random lottery incentive scheme). The 
realization of all random events is performed by subjects themselves, who draw a 
standard bridge card from a box with a specified distribution of cards inside. 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (e.g. Fischbacher, 2007) and 
conducted in the IEW experimental lab in Zurich. 48 undergraduate students of 
the University of Zurich (24 male and 24 female) participated in three 
experimental sessions on December 16 and December 20, 2005. On average, the 
experiment lasted 45 minutes and average earnings, including a 5 CHF show-up 
fee, were 30.50 CHF (median earnings were 23 CHF). A translation of the 
experimental instructions is given in the Appendix. 
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III. Results 
31 out of 48 subjects (65%) are classified as underconfident, 14 (29%)—
as overconfident and only 3 subjects (6%)—as well calibrated. Figure 1 shows 
that individuals with poor general knowledge (1-5 correct answers) and good 
general knowledge (8-9 correct answers) appear to be predominantly 
underconfident. Among those subjects who gave 1-5 correct answers, the 
proportion of underconfident subjects is significantly higher than 50 percent (χ2 
test 8.33, p=0.004). Only individuals with average general knowledge (who 
answered 6-7 questions correctly) exhibit both under- and overconfidence in 
similar proportions. 
Figure 2 shows how individual confidence is related to risk 
aversion/seeking. Horizontal axis allows to differentiate between underconfident, 
well calibrated and overconfident subjects. Vertical axis shows the number 
{ }9,...,1∈i  of a lottery pair in which a subject switches from a safer lottery iS  to a 
riskier lottery iR  in Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. Recall that subjects face 
decision problems in a random order and, therefore, they are not restricted to 
select a unique switching point. Only 26 subjects (54%) in our experiment have a 
unique switching point. For the remaining subjects, Figure 2 shows a vertical line 
that connects the highest number { }9,...,1∈i  such that a subject always chooses 
lottery iS  when ii ≤  and the lowest number { }9,...,1∈i  such that the subject 
always chooses lottery iR  when ii > . 
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Figure 2 shows that the level of confidence is not correlated with risk 
attitudes. Among underconfident subjects, 52% are risk averse, 6%—risk neutral 
and 10%—risk seeking (the remaining subjects cannot be classified). Among 
overconfident subjects, 64% are risk averse, 7%—risk neutral and 14%—risk 
seeking. Overconfident subjects are not significantly more risk averse than 
underconfident subjects (p-value for Fisher’s exact probability test is 0.6192). 
Figure 3 shows that individual confidence is also not correlated with 
ambiguity aversion or seeking. 35% of underconfident subjects are ambiguity 
averse, 10%—ambiguity neutral and 3%—ambiguity seeking. 43% of 
overconfident subjects are ambiguity averse, 29%—ambiguity neutral and 7%—
ambiguity seeking. Obviously, underconfident subjects do not appear to be more 
ambiguity averse than overconfident subjects. Thus, we can conclude that a high 
level of underconfidence observed in our experiment is not due to ambiguity 
aversion or risk seeking.  
Experimental results clearly demonstrate that our proposed measure of 
individual confidence in own knowledge is not affected by individual attitudes 
towards risk or ambiguity. Experimental results also show that subjects appear to 
be predominantly underconfident about their own knowledge, when a new 
incentive compatible method is used. This is consistent with recent findings of 
Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) and Cesarini et al. (2006) that monetary incentives 
tend to reduce the overconfidence bias.  
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IV. Conclusion 
Subjective confidence in own knowledge and/or ability is typically tested 
through the elicitation of confidence intervals. Unfortunately, this procedure is not 
incentive-compatible. This paper proposed a new incentive-compatible measure 
of individual confidence in own knowledge. Individual confidence is measured in 
a simple decision problem where subjects bet either on own knowledge/ability 
(which reveals overconfidence) or on an equivalent risky lottery (which signals 
underconfidence). The proposed measure is robust to possible strategic behavior 
of subjects, when they deliberately provide incorrect answers or contribute low 
effort. The results of a laboratory experiment show that the new measure of 
confidence in own knowledge is not confounded with individual attitudes towards 
risk or ambiguity. 
Experimental results also show that individuals are predominantly 
underconfident. This conclusion does not depend on whether subjects have poor 
or good general knowledge, and whether they are risk/ambiguity averse or 
seeking. Our findings support the conclusion of Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) and 
Cesarini et al. (2006) that monetary incentives tend to reduce (and even reverse) 
the overconfidence bias. Our results also suggest that this bias may be found in 
strategic games (e.g. Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) because subjects receive little 
(or no) information about their counterparts, and not because they have excessive 
confidence in own ability. 
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1. Earth equator is around … 000 km long 40 24 36 52 14 
2. Solar system consists of ... known planets. 13 8 12 9 17 
3. First Tour de France took place in year …  1898 1915 1903 1814 1938 
4. Which triple of notes contains C major? A-C-B D-F-A C-D-G F-C-D C-E-G 
5. Ludwig van Beethoven wrote ... symphonies 15 9 41 13 104 
6. Electric frequency in central Europe is … Hz 220 110 50 66 85 
7. Human cell consists of ... chromosomes. 32 58 46 38 23 
8. Human body has ... sense organs. 4 5 6 7 8 
9. Sum of angles in a triangle is … degrees 360 380 60 90 180 
10. „Lord of the Ring“ is based on a book by ... Tolkien Tolstoy Trotzki Thomas Trevier 
Table 1 Multiple-choice general knowledge questions used in the experiment (with correct 
answers in bold type) 
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Figure 1 Individual confidence and the number of correctly answered general knowledge 
questions 
 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Underconfident Well Calibrated Overconfident
R
is
k
A
ve
rs
e
R
is
k 
Se
ek
in
g
R
is
k
N
eu
tra
l
Lottery pair number i
 
Figure 2 Individual confidence and risk aversion/seeking 
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Figure 3 Individual confidence and ambiguity aversion/seeking
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Appendix 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
Dear participant, 
You are about to participate in the experiment on individual decision making. The 
experiment will last about one hour. Your payoff will depend only on your 
decisions and the realization of random events (it will not be affected by the 
decisions of other participants in the room). 
 
You will be given 19 problems and in each problem you need to choose “Left 
option”, “Right option” or “Both alternatives are the same”. If you choose “Both 
alternatives are the same”, a computer will select either “Left option” or “Right 
option” at random. The problems will appear one by one on your computer 
screen. The example of a typical problem is given below: 
 
Problem 5 
Box I contains: 
5 red cards 
5 black cards 
Box J contains: 
5 blue cards 
5 yellow cards 
One card is drawn from the box. 
You receive  20 CHF if this card is red  40 CHF if this card is blue 
16 CHF if this card is black  1 CHF if this card is yellow 
 
Left option 
 
 
Both alternatives are 
the same 
 
 
Right option 
 
Card is drawn from Box I Card is drawn either from Box I or from Box J 
Card is drawn from Box 
J 
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Your payoff is determined at the end of the experiment (when all participants 
answered all 19 questions). We will give one of the participants a box that 
contains cards numbered from 1 to 19. The participant will draw one card from 
this box. The number on this card will determine one of 19 problems. This 
problem (together with your choice) will reappear on your computer screen. Then 
another contestant (it could be you!) will draw a card from the box THAT YOU 
HAVE CHOSEN in this problem. The color of this card will determine your 
payoff.  
 
For example, suppose that the first drawn card has number 5 and problem 5 
presented above reappears on your screen. And suppose that you have chosen 
“Right option” in this problem. Then one of the contestants will be asked to draw 
one card from Box J. If this card is blue, your payoff in the experiment is 40 CHF. 
If this card is yellow, your payoff in the experiment is 1 CHF.  
 
Your payoff will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. All boxes used 
in the experiment are available for inspection after the experiment. If you have 
any further questions, please ask them now.   
  
 
